PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO TAJONERA, respondent, G.R. No. 195889, Sept. 24, 2014

 Doctrine:      Failure to perform a reciprocal obligation is a Breach of Contract.  Under the law, a loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to another, on the condition that the same amount or quality shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one party is the creditor, and the other is the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal obligation is dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should ideally be simultaneous. This means that in a loan, the creditor should release the full loan amount and the debtor repays it when it becomes due and demandable.

Facts:

Through Rosario, the Vice President of Eduarosa Realty Development, Inc. (ERDI) obtained loans from Philippine National Bank (PNB) and entered into several credit agreements to finance the completion of the construction of their 20-storey Eduarosa Tower Condominium.

Pursuant to the Credit Agreement, ERDI obtained from PNB a loan in the amount of ₱60,000,000.00 plus ₱5,000,000.00 Domestic Bills. To secure this initial loan, ERDI mortgaged in favor of PNB its Paranaque properties together with the 20-storey condominium building to be erected thereon.

Subsequently, ERDI and PNB entered into The First Amendment wherein the former obtained an additional loan of ₱40,000,000.00. As security for the additional loan, the ERDI’s Greenhills property was mortgaged as evidenced by the Supplement to Mortgage.

Thereafter, the parties made Second Amendment was likewise entered into by the parties for the purpose of extending the repayment dates of the loan and the additional loan. Afterward, A Third Amendment was entered into by the parties wherein the respondents were granted a second additional loan of ₱55,000,000.00.

Nevertheless, ERDI failed to settle its obligation. As a consequence, PNB filed an application for foreclosure of the Greenhills property. As the highest bidder, PNB was issued the Certificate of Sale. Upon ERDI’s failure to redeem the property, PNB consolidated its title and caused the cancellation of the title in the name of the respondent. A new title was issued in the name of PNB.

This prompted the respondents to file a complaint against PNB for annulment of sale, cancellation of title, cancellation of mortgage, and damages before the RTC.

The RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondents on the ground that PNB did not release the remaining balance of the approved loan under the Third Amendment.   PNB appealed to CA, but CA affirms TRC’s decision with modification.

Issue:           Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the mortgage contract constituted over the Greenhills property of the respondents?

Held:            PNB insists that there was no breach of its contractual obligation when it did not release the remaining balance of the approved loan to the respondents considering that the latter had no history of any payment either on interest or principal of the loan.

The agreement between PNB and the respondents was one of a loan. Under the law, a loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or quality shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one party is the creditor, and the other the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal obligation is dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should ideally be simultaneous. This means that in a loan, the creditor should release the full loan amount and the debtor repays it when it becomes due and demandable.

PNB, not having released the balance of the last loan proceeds in accordance with the Third Amendment had no right to demand from the respondent compliance with their own obligation under the loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its obligation, the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of them while the other's obligation remains unfulfilled.

In view of the foregoing, the court a quo aptly ruled that the refusal of PNB to release portion of the additional loan granted under the Third Amendment to Credit Transaction is not justified. In this jurisdiction, breach of contract is defined as:

It is the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.

Undoubtedly, PNB breached its contractual obligation when it failed to release to Appellees the remaining balance of the approved loan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

 

THEFT AT A GLANCE UNDER SHARI’AH LAW

Theft or Sariqa defined,

One of the legal punishments under Shari’ah rulings is the crime of theft. Generally, it prescribed the cutting-off-the-hands of the offender. The Arabic term for theft is “sariqa”, under Islamic jurisprudence sariqa or theft is categorized as hadd, means a punishment in which it is divinely fixed by the Supreme. In other words, the crime and punishment for sariqa or theft under Shari’ah ruling cannot be altered and modified in a sense as to subrogate its primary injunction.   

According to Muslim scholars, sariqa had been defined as the surreptitious removal of legally recognized property in the safe keeping of another person, that amounts to a specific minimum to which the thief has no right of ownership and which has not been entrusted to him, (Olaf Kondogen, p. 269, 2018). Sariqa may be defined as clandestine taking of things not entrusted to the taker and belonging to someone else, (Alauya, p. 225, 1999).

General rule

In Islam, to steal is absolutely haram or prohibited even a slightest pick of atom be taken without prior consents or permission from the owner. The well-known rulings of theft under Shari’ah have been legislated from its primary source. For instance, in verse 38, Surah al Maidah, it provides that: 

وَٱلسَّارِقُ وَٱلسَّارِقَةُ فَٱقْطَعُوٓا۟ أَيْدِيَهُمَا جَزَآءًۢ بِمَا كَسَبَا نَكَـٰلًۭا مِّنَ ٱللَّهِ ۗ وَٱللَّهُ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌۭ

As for male and female thieves, cut off their hands for what they have done—a deterrent from Allah. And Allah is Almighty, All-Wise

The hadd punishment on sariqa in this verse is general in nature. If anyone is responsible for stealing saved items, his or her hand will be chopped off. It does not specify as to which hands of the offender be severed, and up to what extent. This is where the authentic hadith, or traditions of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) be applied as interpretation to the primary sources of Muslim law. Meanwhile, it has to be noted that when the Supreme legislates His divine law, such is proceeded with wisdom. 

Apparently, this general law on amputation serves as exemplary, and as to forewarn the potential offender of the same crime in the future.  The phrase “كَسَبَا نَكَـٰلًۭا مِّنَ ٱللَّهِ ” (a deterrent from Allah) within the verse is the reason why law on amputation is prescribed.

Exception to the Rule

Under Islamic jurisprudence, there are two main divisions of mandatory law; the Azima and Rukhsa. Azima means determined, while Rukhsa means concessions. Rukhsa is the complete opposite of the former.  Azima refers to mandatory and strict compliance of the law or fulfilment of a duty. In Azima principle, there is no way out not to perform the obligations under which is mandated by the law Giver.  However, due to recognized circumstances beyond the control of humans which affect his non-performance of the duties, the Azima principle such as imposition of Law on Amputation may be suspended. Thus, Rukhsa will attend to address the burden and hardships. When there is:

• 1.  Widespread of famine, during the reign of Caliph Umar Bin Khataab, the law on sariqa was suspended by him due to the extensive starvation.

• 2.    Things may be decay or go to waste as such fruits, milk, fish, and the liked are not subject to law on amputation because of the hadith: 

لاَ قَطْعَ فِي ثَمَرٍ مُعَلَّقٍ وَلاَ فِي حَرِيسَةِ جَبَلٍ‏ فَإِذَا آوَاهُ الْمُرَاحُ أَوِ الْجَرِينُ فَالْقَطْعُ فِيمَا يَبْلُغُ ثَمَنَ الْمِجَنِّ

 

“The hand is not cut off for fruit hanging on the tree and for sheep kept in the mountains. So when they are taken from the fold or the place where the fruit is dried, a hand is cut off for whatever reaches the price of a shield.” (Sunan Abu Dawud, Book 17, Hadith No. 37).

• 3.       Less than the cost of the shield, the offender would not be subject to law on amputation if the value of the stolen item were less in value. Based on the hadith:

 

لاَ تُقْطَعُ يَدُ السَّارِقِ فِيمَا دُونَ الْمِجَنِّ

 

“The hand of the thief is not to be cut off for anything less than a shield." (Sahih Bhukari. Book 5, Hadith. No. 4939).

• 4.    The owner of the property pardons the offender after restoration, the Prophet (PBUH) permitted the non-enforcement of the cutting-off of the hand if it established that the offender had repented and reformed himself, provided that property stolen is restored.  

 

فَمَن تَابَ مِنۢ بَعْدِ ظُلْمِهِۦ وَأَصْلَحَ فَإِنَّ ٱللَّهَ يَتُوبُ عَلَيْهِ ۗ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ غَفُورٌۭ رَّحِيمٌ

 

“But whoever repents after their wrongdoing and mends their ways, Allah will surely turn to them in forgiveness. Indeed, Allah is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful.” (Q5:39)

Essential elements of the crime of sariqa or Theft

Under Islamic law, the perpetrator in the crime of sariqa must be of the following: al Baligh or adult, al Aql or sane person (sound mind), and an intention of stealing, that is, he cannot be acted under foreign force. These three elements are necessary to establish the crime of sariqa. Moreover, it must be attested by at least two credible witnesses.

وَأَشْهِدُوا۟ ذَوَىْ عَدْلٍۢ مِّنكُمْ وَأَقِيمُوا۟ ٱلشَّهَـٰدَةَ لِلَّهِ

“And call two of your reliable men to witness and let the witnesses bear true testimony for the sake of Allah.” (Q65:2)

To appreciate the punishment for theft, the offender must be a sane adult who knows that theft is forbidden, the crime has to be proven either by confession or the testimony of two reliable witnesses as required from quoted verse, the stolen item has to be of value and taken secretly from a safe place, and the owner has to claim it. Otherwise, there shall be no amputation.

 

The Value for which, if it is stolen, the (Thief's) Hand is to be cut off

The minimum value of stolen property to appreciate the imposition of amputation is ranging from three (3) Dirhams or more, and/or its equivalent.

Numerous provisions from the hadith on this matter. For instance, in one narrated by Ibn Umar, the Prophet Mohammed (BPUH) cut off the hand of a thief for stealing a shield that was worth three Dirhams. (Sahih Bukhari, Book 86, Vol. 8, Bk. 81, Hadith No. 788-791).  

 

 

 

Francis Malaki and Jacqueline Mae, petitioners, vs. Republic, respondents

 G.R. No. 221075, November 15, 2021

FACTS:

On March 26, 1988, Francis and Nerrian were married under religious rite of Islesia ni Cristo in Panabo City, Davao del Norte. In 2005, Francis left the family home for Tagum City to find a job. He later abandoned their family. Nerrian discovered that he was cohabiting with Jacqueline and that they contracted marriage on June 18, 2005, solemnized by a Municipal Trial Court judge.  

Nerrian filed a crime for bigamy against Francis and Jacqueline on the ground that her marriage with Francis is legally valid and still subsisting, it has never been dissolved. 

Francis and Jacqueline admitted that they got married while Francis' marriage to Nerrian was subsisting. However, they claimed that they could not be penalized for bigamy as they converted to Islam prior to their marriage.

On May 7, 2012, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision Francis and Jaqueline found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. It reasoned that the Muslim Code and Zamoranos v. People do not govern the circumstances of Nerrian, Francis, and Jaqueline considering that Nerrian is not a Muslim. The Court Appeals denied petitioner’s appealed and upheld the RTC’ decision.  

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not petitioners Francis D. Malaki, Sr. and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin are guilty of bigamy? 

2. Whether or not a party to a civil marriage who converts to Islam and subsequently marries under the Muslim Code is exempted from criminal liability of bigamy?

COURT'S RULING:

1. Contracting a second marriage without the previous declaration of nullity of the first consummates the crime of bigamy.  To successfully prosecute this crime, the following elements must be proven: 

i) that the offender has been legally married;

ii) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 

iii) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and 

iv) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

The Court of Appeals found that all elements of bigamy were present. It held that unless the first marriage was dissolved and finalized under the Civil Code, any party's subsequent marriage shall make them liable for bigamy.

Petitioners admit that Francis was legally married to Nerrian and that the marriage was not dissolved. They likewise admit that they subsequently married despite the subsistence of Francis' marriage to Nerrian. These admissions sufficiently establish all the elements of bigamy which prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

However, they claim that they both converted to Islam and were married under Muslim rites.  They contend that Muslims may subsequently marry and this exculpates them from criminal liability. 

2. The Article 162 spells out the formal requisites for the Muslim husband's subsequent marriage: 

Any Muslim husband desiring to contract a subsequent marriage shall, before so doing, file a written notice thereof with the Clerk of Court of the Shari 'a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. Upon receipt of said notice, the Clerk shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them object, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of the preceding article. If the Agama Arbitration Council fails to obtain the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether or not to sustain her objection.

Francis did not comply with the requirements provided, and even testified that he does not know that such is required, as he declared in open court that he only knew he can remarry. The failure of Francis to comply with the requisites betrays his invocation of Islamic law as an excuse for his indiscretion. 

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' April 24, 2015 Decision and September 17, 2015 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 00990-MIN are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

_____

Principle:

The general principle underlying Muslim Code in the Philippine is the rule on Polygamy. Under Muslim Code, it allows polygamy as provided in Art. 27, said: 

“Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more than one wife but not more than four at a time, no Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them with equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic law and only in exceptional cases.”    

That was the conditional rule under which Muslim male were allowed to contract subsequent marriage. But, the case like Francis and Jacqueline is something beyond what laws about.  This illegal practice where they convert to Islam solely to remarry is circumvention to the law, and it hurts the religious feeling of those who abide the principle.  

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

 G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development. It is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions of the petitioner is carries out to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.

The petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal it has formulated internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications.

However, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 s. 2001 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating the OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, the OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

Hence, this petition for prohibition was filed.

Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not EO 46, s 2001 issued by the Executive Secretary violate the Constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State? 

COURT’S RULING:  

Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same.

 

 

PATRICK A. CARONAN, (Complainant) VS. RICHARD CARONAN a.k.a. Atty. Patrick Caronan, (Respondent)

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

FACTS:

Complainant and respondent are siblings. Patrick Caronan has graduated and completed his pre-law education at University of Makati., on the other hand, his brother Richard Caronan, a.k.a. Atty. Patrick Caronan do not completed his bachelor’s degree.  Richard Caronan took the “education records and identify” of his brother and used it to study law. Subsequently, he took the bar and passed. Thus, he became Atty. Patrick Caronan and practice law. 

The complaint learned that the respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities. Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, other similar crimes. 

Now, due to the controversies and fear for his own safety and security. The complainant filed Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of his name and identity.  

Upon investigation, the IBP's reported that indeed, the respondent is guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records. Thus, it ordered the name Atty. Patrick Caronan be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be   stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

COURT'S RULING:

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

The IBP is correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course. 

Respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity. 

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. 

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC v. CA (and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA)

G.R. No. 108763, Feb. 13, 1997

FACTS:

Roridel Olaviano Monila and Reylando Molina were legally married and their marriage was blessed with a son. However, after a year when their son was born, Reylando shows signs of immaturity and irresponsible as a husband and a father. Reynaldo spent more time with his friends and become dependent with his parents, and never been honest to his wife financially. The couple engaged in an intense quarrel  which caused Molina went to Bagio and live her family, while Reynaldo relieved from his work and abandoned his wife and their child.

Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina on the ground of psychological incapacity. She contended that Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual. 

In his answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals, and failure to run the household and handle their finances.

The trial court had declared the marriage of Molina to Reynaldo void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

An appeal was filed to CA, but such was denied, and the CA sustained the lower court’s decision. 

However, the CA’s decision was assailed by the Office of Solicitor General insisting that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world"

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case?

COURT'S RULING: 

The petition is meritorious. 

“the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.  It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Shari’ah and Fiqh, a Simplified Explanation in Between

What is Shari’ah and how it be distinguished from Fiqh?

Firstly, allow me to reiterate the three well-known definitions of Shari’ah. It was defined as “Totality of God’s Commandments”. In other materials (Muhammad Shalabee, p., 13, 1983), it was defined as “Sum of the Islamic Law which were revealed to the Prophet Mohammed ﷺ, and which recorded in the Qur’an as well as deducible from the Prophet’s divinely-lifestyle.” It also defined as “that which would not be known had there not been a Divine revelation” (Sard-us Shari’at Tawdih, cit., Abdul Razak, p., 1, 1985)

Now, from the given definition, when it said, “totality” it signifies the broadness of this law. From head to foot, from life to death, all are embraced. Further, it doesn’t solely pertain to the purview of its comprehensiveness, but more so in its perfection. 

Notably, the fundamental and legal aspect of this is when He said, (Al Maidah: 5)اَ لۡيَوۡمَ اَكۡمَلۡتُ لَـكُمۡ دِيۡنَكُمۡ وَاَ تۡمَمۡتُ عَلَيۡكُمۡ نِعۡمَتِىۡ وَرَضِيۡتُ لَـكُمُ الۡاِسۡلَامَ دِيۡنًا “This day, I have perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion.” 

Accordingly, the Supreme whom this law originated had concluded of what is permissible and impermissible. The law He has Legislated and everything that enclosed therein conveys truth and authenticity. That is Islamic law or Shari’ah; the general context of the law, and a broad concept of law regulating either spiritual or human business affairs. It clenches all human actions.   

Shari’ah has four primary sources, namely: the Qur’an, Hadith, Ijma, and Qiyas. There are other sources of this law found in many references on Islamic jurisprudence. 

The study, analysis and deduction of these sources mainly at the four major sources, is now the field of fiqh.  It is well known as Usul al Fiqh, which defined as “science of Shari’ah values related to the conduct from their respective evidence” (Agnides, cit., Alauya, p., 3, 1999).

So, because Shari’ah law is broad in a sense, when particular issues or cases not specifically delineated by the law itself, then the faqhi (jurist) will resort to interpret the text of the Qur’an in order to arrive at determine quality of Shari’ah value. 

In a sense, the Shari’ah is what we meant the general laws revealed by the Supreme to His last Prophet, while Fiqh is the human interpretation of such revealed laws. Shari’ah represent the ample principles of laws, whereas fiqh is the extraction and appreciations of Shari’ah ruling reclusively out of that principle. Fiqh is the process of unveiling legal or illegal out of what has been given by Him.