ATCI Overseas Corporation, vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010

Doctrine of processual presumption

The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.

Facts: Local agency hired Josefa on behalf of principal foreign employer as Medical Technologist for a period of two years. Their agreement states therein that Josefa will have to undergo a probationary period of one year, and that their agreement will be governed by the Kuwaiti Civil Administrative law. One year later after deployment, foreign employer terminated Josefa's employment contract on the ground that she failed to pass the probationary measure set forth in the Kuwaiti Civil Administrative law. When Josefa returned to the Philippines, she file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.   

Issue:    Whether or not the Kuwaiti administrative law governed the employment contract between Josefa and her foreign employer? 

Held:      However, ATCI failed to prove the existence of Kuwaiti Civil Law as required under Section 24 of the Rule 132 of the Rules of court, which provide that “If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office”. 

The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.

Amminudin Vs. People, G.R. No. 74869 July 6, 1988

 The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Facts:

Aminnudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon in Iloilo City. He was arrested without a warrant of arrest. The police officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was Identified by name.

Acting on this tip, the police officer waited for him in the port of his destination. Thereafter, at the port he was apprehend as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.

Aminnudin argued that the evidence charged against him is inadmissible since he was unlawfully arrested, and that there was no valid warrant of arrest or search warrant issued against him. However, the police officer averred that the arrest was valid by virtue of Flagrante Delicto.

Issue:              The issue in this case in relation to our subject is whether or not the warrantless arrest against Amminudin is valid?

 

Held:              No, the warrantless against Amminudin was not valid.

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.

To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.

People VS. Sandiganbayan-Lauro Baja, GR No. 233437, April 26, 2021

Doctrine:      Once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant    amounts to an acquittal. Any further prosecution for the same offense would violate the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy.

 

FACTS: 

On March 12, 2008, Jaime D. Jacob (Jacob), a representative of the Philippine Anti-Graft Commission, filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against Baja. He accused Baja of violating Republic Act No. 3019, and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. He argued that:

LAURO L. BAJA, JR., holding then the position of Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Chief of Mission I, Department of Foreign Affairs, who by reason of his office and while in the exercise and discharge of his functions, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and committing the offense in relation to office, when his reimbursement for non-existent or fictitious representation expenses in the total amounts of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR DOLLARS, United States Currency (US$28,934.96), thereby causing undue injury to the Government in the said amount.

Baja filed his Demurrer to Evidence which stated that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the Information. Among others, he argued that the expenses for which reimbursement claims had been made were not proven to be "non-existent or fictitious."  That Baja improperly documented the expenses, he said, did not mean that these expenses did not exist. He also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his bad faith, or that there was "undue injury, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions."

The Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution granting Baja's Demurrer to Evidence.

ISSUE:         Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari is barred by respondent Lauro L. Baja, Jr.'s right against jeopardy?

HELD:          Under Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, all persons have the right not to be placed in double jeopardy of punishment for one offense. This Court has held that once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant amounts to an acquittal, and any further prosecution for the same offense would violate Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution.

Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

In the case of accused Baja, the prosecution failed to establish sufficient evidence that accused Baja caused the reimbursement of non­-existent or fictitious representation expenses. The prosecution bore the burden to prove the allegations in the Information. If its evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense charged, respondent Baja's guilt could not have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The grant of the Demurrer to Evidence was proper.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolution are AFFIRMED.

Angelito Magno, (petitioner) VS. Ombudsman (respondent), GR. NO. 230575, March 14, 2018

 DOCTRINE:  The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.

FACTS:

On May 14, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner Angelito Magno with Multiple Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder. In the course of the prosecution's presentation of witnesses, the RTC sustained a petitioner's objection on the admissibility of one of the witness's testimonies, prompting the prosecution to elevate the matter to the Sandiganbayan. The SANDIGANBAYAN issued a sixty (60)-day TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding with Crim. Case No. DU-10123. In a Decision dated February 12, 2007, the SANDIGANBAYAN dismissed the Objection.

Meanwhile and after the expiration of the TRO in the Objection Case, petitioner filed on March 16, 2006 a Motion to Set Case for Continuous Hearing before the RTC, invoking his right to speedy trial. In an Order dated June 16, 2006, the RTC granted petitioner's motion, and accordingly, set the hearing on September 1, 2006. The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in an Order dated August 18, 2006. On September 1, 2006. Such presentation continued all the way until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset the hearing to August 16, 2007 due to the handling prosecutor's illness.

However, it appears that from such postponement until around early 2010, no hearings were conducted in the case. Hence, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial which the trial court granted. But the Sandiganbayan set aside the trial’ court ruling and reinstituted the criminal action against the petitioner

ISSUE:  Whether or not petitioner Angelito Magno’s right to speedy disposition of       his    has                been violated?  

HELD:   The petition is meritorious. An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

In Tan v. People, the Court ruled that the right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. 

In this case, the Court ruled that the numerous delays and postponements that occurred during the First Period were excusable. Under this case, the Supreme Court highlighted the essential elements of the right to speedy trial. These are the: Length of delay; Reason for the delay; Failure to assert the right of the accused; Prejudice caused by the delay. The Supreme Court also emphasized that a violation of this right should be accompanied by the following; vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to the defendant.

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the resolution of Criminal action as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, the Court concludes that petitioner's right to speedy trial had been violated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in SANDIGANBAYAN are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

MIRIAM SANTIAGO vs. GARCHITORINA, GR. NO. 109266, December 7, 1993

Doctrine:         

The doctrine of delicti continuado also known as continued crime. The court defined continued crime as to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

FACTS:

Miriam Santiago, the petitioner in this case filed a motion for Bill of Particular in relation to the criminal case charged against her. In that Criminal case, it was alleged that the petitioner had violated Executive Order No. 324, when it approved the application of those aliens for legalization of their stay in the country, though these aliens are not qualified under the law. To that effect of the approval, she was prosecuted to be held accountable under R.A. 3019.

During the hearing of the motion for Bill of articular, the prosecutor manifested that they would file only one amended information. However, it turns out that the prosecutor had filed 32 Amended Informations against the petitioner.

Thus, the petitioner claimed that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government, and could not be held accountable of those 32 Amended Informations.

 

The ISSUE in this case in relation to our subject is whether or not the petitioner Miriam Santiago is liable for the 32 Amended Informations instead of the single Information originally filed against her? 

 

HELD: 

In decision this case, the court reiterated the doctrine of delicti continuado also known as continued crime. The court defined continued crime as to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delicto continuado consist of several crimes but in reality, there is one only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.

In the case at the bench, the original information charged the petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

 

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. The Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations.

 

DANILO BUHAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents., G.R. No. 119601 December 17, 1996

 FACTS:

An Information for homicide was filed in the RTC against Danny Buhat. The Information alleged that Danny Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed Ramon Yu while the said two unknown persons held his arms, using superior strength, inflicting, mortal wound which caused his death.

The City Prosecutor filed the aforementioned Information for homicide before RTC. However, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Prosecutor to amend the Information by upgrading the offense charge from homicide to murder, which the Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend the Information. The RTC, however, denied the motion of amendment and ordered the prosecution of the criminal offense of homicide.

Meanwhile, the OSG elevated the case to CA assailing the order of the trial court in denying the motion to amend the original Information filed. The CA granted the assailed order of the trial court.

Thereafter, the original Information of criminal offense of homicide was amended into murder which included two other accused conspiring and confederating, helping each other in the killing of Ramon Yu.    

ISSUE: whether or not the amendment of the original Information of criminal offense from homicide to murder is procedurally infirmed?

HELD:

Jurisprudential rule is that an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons in addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment.

In the case of Regala Vs. Bataan, we ruled that an amendment of an original Information with an indictment by including two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging conspiracy was held that amendment is not substantial and is allowed.

We also ruled in the case of Dimalibot Vs. Salcedo that an amendment of the Information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made, even if it may result in altering the nature of the charged so long as it can be done without prejudice to the to the right of the accused.

In this case, the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:

Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused of Danny Buhat stabbing the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, "the Information already alleged superior strength"; and inflicting mortal wounds which led to the death of Ramon.

Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas City is HEREBY ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information.

ROGELIO JUAN, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000

 FACTS:

Juan, an incumbent Punong Barangay, together with another Barangay Kagawad was charged with a criminal offense in violation of Omnibus Election Code and the R.A. 3019. During the election campaign, Rogelio Juan had willfully and unlawfully used a Radio Transceiver owned and controlled property of the Barangay. The other accused also willfully and unlawfully used a motor vehicle owned by the same Barangay.

A Motion for Removal from the Office was filed against them before the Regional Trial Court.

Rogelio together with the other accused have filed their comments on the ground that the RTC do not have jurisdiction over the case, but instead, it was the MTC having cognization thereof since the penalty does not exceed six years. They also argued that their case is not subject to R.A.3019.

However, upon trial and investigation, the trial court issued its decision granting the Motion for Removal from their office.

ISSUES:

1.         Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

2.         Whether or not preventive suspension under R.A. 3091 be applied in this case?

 

HELD:

1.     Yes. It is evident from Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691, that the jurisdiction of first-level courts, the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provision of law are cognizable by regional trial courts.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, it provides that the regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Code, "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.

2.     Yes. Section 13 of R.A. 3019, as amended, provides: Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid Information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office…

It must be emphasized that petitioners were incumbent public officers charged with the unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in their custody, in the pursuit of personal interests. The crime being imputed to them is akin to that committed by public officers as laid down in the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, petitioners' acts constitute fraud against the government; thus, the present case is covered by Section 13 of RA 3019.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.