Cynthia Moreno, petitioner, Vs. Sandiganbayan, respondent

GR. No. 256070, September 19, 2022

Cynthia Moreno is a former mayor of Aloguinsan, Cebu. On June 5, 2014, she was found guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Petitioner and her co accused filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the Motion praying that she be allowed to serve her sentence under home care or house arrest, under the direct and close monitoring and supervision of the local BJMP officers.

In the Resolution, however, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for failure to provide evidence, i.e., medical records or physician's report, to show that she is suffering from such health conditions that thwarted her movement and usual way of living. The Sandiganbayan likewise noted that "home care/house arrest" does not appear in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and that there is no law providing for an alternative mode of confinement based on health considerations for prisoners convicted by final judgment; hence, petitioner should serve her sentence only in the places provided for by law in accordance with Articles 78 and 86 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion?

Held:  The Court finds that petitioner's Motion is an unmeritorious motion which was correctly dismissed outright by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 2(c), Part III of the Continuous Trial Guidelines.

(c) Meritorious Motions. — Motions that allege plausible grounds supported by relevant documents and/or competent evidence, except those that are already covered by the Revised Guidelines, are meritorious motions.

Motions that do not conform to the above requirements shall be considered unmeritorious and shall be denied outright.

As aptly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's Motion was not supported by-relevant documents, i.e., medical record or physician's report. Notably, the documents attached by petitioner in her Motion, i.e., the various awards she received, etc., are irrelevant to the ground she cited as basis for her "home care/house arrest," that is, her poor health condition. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied the Motion outright in the Resolution without setting it for hearing.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that there was nothing capricious, whimsical, or even arbitrary in the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's Motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Moon Sighting for Edil Al Fitr 2026

Religious practice is always a choice. But the recommended one was that based on the precepts of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ).

He said, “…Observe Saum at sighting of the crescent of Ramadan and terminate it at sighting the crescent (of Shawwal). If the sky is overcast, complete (the month as) thirty (days)." [Riyad As-Salihin, Book 8, Hadith No.235]

عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما قال‏:‏ قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ‏ "‏ صوموا لرؤيته وأفطروا لرؤيته، فإن حالت دونه فأكملوا ثلاثين يومًا‏"    ‏  

Moreover, "When you see the crescent (of the month of Ramadan), start fasting, and when you see the crescent (of the month of Shawwal), stop fasting; and if the sky is overcast (and you can't see it) then regard the month of Ramadan as of 30 days."

[Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book No. 30, Hadith No. 10].

 

"‏ إِذَا رَأَيْتُمُوهُ فَصُومُوا، وَإِذَا رَأَيْتُمُوهُ فَأَفْطِرُوا، فَإِنْ غُمَّ عَلَيْكُمْ فَاقْدُرُوا لَهُ ‏"

 

What is the Doctrine of Verba Legis and how does it apply?

It is “A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.” (Amores vs. House of Rep. Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010).

That precepts held by the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. There is no room for any further interpretation, the only thing remaining is to apply the rules set forth by him.

While it is true that the crescent moon is only one and sighting it from one region does not bind the whole universe due to some circumstance (i.e., if the sky is cloudy). This is the reason of why Salatul Eid al Fitr will be held on Saturday, March 21, 2026, in some areas in the Philippines pursuant to the rulings of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ).

Happy Eid Fitr al Mubarak!

 

 

ATCI Overseas Corporation, vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010

Doctrine of processual presumption

The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.

Facts: Local agency hired Josefa on behalf of principal foreign employer as Medical Technologist for a period of two years. Their agreement states therein that Josefa will have to undergo a probationary period of one year, and that their agreement will be governed by the Kuwaiti Civil Administrative law. One year later after deployment, foreign employer terminated Josefa's employment contract on the ground that she failed to pass the probationary measure set forth in the Kuwaiti Civil Administrative law. When Josefa returned to the Philippines, she file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.   

Issue:    Whether or not the Kuwaiti administrative law governed the employment contract between Josefa and her foreign employer? 

Held:      However, ATCI failed to prove the existence of Kuwaiti Civil Law as required under Section 24 of the Rule 132 of the Rules of court, which provide that “If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office”. 

The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.

Amminudin Vs. People, G.R. No. 74869 July 6, 1988

 The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Facts:

Aminnudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon in Iloilo City. He was arrested without a warrant of arrest. The police officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was Identified by name.

Acting on this tip, the police officer waited for him in the port of his destination. Thereafter, at the port he was apprehend as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.

Aminnudin argued that the evidence charged against him is inadmissible since he was unlawfully arrested, and that there was no valid warrant of arrest or search warrant issued against him. However, the police officer averred that the arrest was valid by virtue of Flagrante Delicto.

Issue:              The issue in this case in relation to our subject is whether or not the warrantless arrest against Amminudin is valid?

 

Held:              No, the warrantless against Amminudin was not valid.

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.

To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.

People VS. Sandiganbayan-Lauro Baja, GR No. 233437, April 26, 2021

Doctrine:      Once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant    amounts to an acquittal. Any further prosecution for the same offense would violate the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy.

 

FACTS: 

On March 12, 2008, Jaime D. Jacob (Jacob), a representative of the Philippine Anti-Graft Commission, filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against Baja. He accused Baja of violating Republic Act No. 3019, and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. He argued that:

LAURO L. BAJA, JR., holding then the position of Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Chief of Mission I, Department of Foreign Affairs, who by reason of his office and while in the exercise and discharge of his functions, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and committing the offense in relation to office, when his reimbursement for non-existent or fictitious representation expenses in the total amounts of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR DOLLARS, United States Currency (US$28,934.96), thereby causing undue injury to the Government in the said amount.

Baja filed his Demurrer to Evidence which stated that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the Information. Among others, he argued that the expenses for which reimbursement claims had been made were not proven to be "non-existent or fictitious."  That Baja improperly documented the expenses, he said, did not mean that these expenses did not exist. He also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his bad faith, or that there was "undue injury, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions."

The Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution granting Baja's Demurrer to Evidence.

ISSUE:         Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari is barred by respondent Lauro L. Baja, Jr.'s right against jeopardy?

HELD:          Under Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, all persons have the right not to be placed in double jeopardy of punishment for one offense. This Court has held that once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant amounts to an acquittal, and any further prosecution for the same offense would violate Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution.

Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

In the case of accused Baja, the prosecution failed to establish sufficient evidence that accused Baja caused the reimbursement of non­-existent or fictitious representation expenses. The prosecution bore the burden to prove the allegations in the Information. If its evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense charged, respondent Baja's guilt could not have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The grant of the Demurrer to Evidence was proper.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolution are AFFIRMED.

Angelito Magno, (petitioner) VS. Ombudsman (respondent), GR. NO. 230575, March 14, 2018

 DOCTRINE:  The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.

FACTS:

On May 14, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner Angelito Magno with Multiple Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder. In the course of the prosecution's presentation of witnesses, the RTC sustained a petitioner's objection on the admissibility of one of the witness's testimonies, prompting the prosecution to elevate the matter to the Sandiganbayan. The SANDIGANBAYAN issued a sixty (60)-day TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding with Crim. Case No. DU-10123. In a Decision dated February 12, 2007, the SANDIGANBAYAN dismissed the Objection.

Meanwhile and after the expiration of the TRO in the Objection Case, petitioner filed on March 16, 2006 a Motion to Set Case for Continuous Hearing before the RTC, invoking his right to speedy trial. In an Order dated June 16, 2006, the RTC granted petitioner's motion, and accordingly, set the hearing on September 1, 2006. The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in an Order dated August 18, 2006. On September 1, 2006. Such presentation continued all the way until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset the hearing to August 16, 2007 due to the handling prosecutor's illness.

However, it appears that from such postponement until around early 2010, no hearings were conducted in the case. Hence, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial which the trial court granted. But the Sandiganbayan set aside the trial’ court ruling and reinstituted the criminal action against the petitioner

ISSUE:  Whether or not petitioner Angelito Magno’s right to speedy disposition of       his    has                been violated?  

HELD:   The petition is meritorious. An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

In Tan v. People, the Court ruled that the right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. 

In this case, the Court ruled that the numerous delays and postponements that occurred during the First Period were excusable. Under this case, the Supreme Court highlighted the essential elements of the right to speedy trial. These are the: Length of delay; Reason for the delay; Failure to assert the right of the accused; Prejudice caused by the delay. The Supreme Court also emphasized that a violation of this right should be accompanied by the following; vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to the defendant.

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the resolution of Criminal action as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, the Court concludes that petitioner's right to speedy trial had been violated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in SANDIGANBAYAN are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

MIRIAM SANTIAGO vs. GARCHITORINA, GR. NO. 109266, December 7, 1993

Doctrine:         

The doctrine of delicti continuado also known as continued crime. The court defined continued crime as to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

FACTS:

Miriam Santiago, the petitioner in this case filed a motion for Bill of Particular in relation to the criminal case charged against her. In that Criminal case, it was alleged that the petitioner had violated Executive Order No. 324, when it approved the application of those aliens for legalization of their stay in the country, though these aliens are not qualified under the law. To that effect of the approval, she was prosecuted to be held accountable under R.A. 3019.

During the hearing of the motion for Bill of articular, the prosecutor manifested that they would file only one amended information. However, it turns out that the prosecutor had filed 32 Amended Informations against the petitioner.

Thus, the petitioner claimed that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government, and could not be held accountable of those 32 Amended Informations.

 

The ISSUE in this case in relation to our subject is whether or not the petitioner Miriam Santiago is liable for the 32 Amended Informations instead of the single Information originally filed against her? 

 

HELD: 

In decision this case, the court reiterated the doctrine of delicti continuado also known as continued crime. The court defined continued crime as to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delicto continuado consist of several crimes but in reality, there is one only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.

In the case at the bench, the original information charged the petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

 

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. The Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations.

 

DANILO BUHAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents., G.R. No. 119601 December 17, 1996

 FACTS:

An Information for homicide was filed in the RTC against Danny Buhat. The Information alleged that Danny Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed Ramon Yu while the said two unknown persons held his arms, using superior strength, inflicting, mortal wound which caused his death.

The City Prosecutor filed the aforementioned Information for homicide before RTC. However, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Prosecutor to amend the Information by upgrading the offense charge from homicide to murder, which the Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend the Information. The RTC, however, denied the motion of amendment and ordered the prosecution of the criminal offense of homicide.

Meanwhile, the OSG elevated the case to CA assailing the order of the trial court in denying the motion to amend the original Information filed. The CA granted the assailed order of the trial court.

Thereafter, the original Information of criminal offense of homicide was amended into murder which included two other accused conspiring and confederating, helping each other in the killing of Ramon Yu.    

ISSUE: whether or not the amendment of the original Information of criminal offense from homicide to murder is procedurally infirmed?

HELD:

Jurisprudential rule is that an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons in addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment.

In the case of Regala Vs. Bataan, we ruled that an amendment of an original Information with an indictment by including two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging conspiracy was held that amendment is not substantial and is allowed.

We also ruled in the case of Dimalibot Vs. Salcedo that an amendment of the Information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made, even if it may result in altering the nature of the charged so long as it can be done without prejudice to the to the right of the accused.

In this case, the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:

Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused of Danny Buhat stabbing the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, "the Information already alleged superior strength"; and inflicting mortal wounds which led to the death of Ramon.

Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas City is HEREBY ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information.

ROGELIO JUAN, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000

 FACTS:

Juan, an incumbent Punong Barangay, together with another Barangay Kagawad was charged with a criminal offense in violation of Omnibus Election Code and the R.A. 3019. During the election campaign, Rogelio Juan had willfully and unlawfully used a Radio Transceiver owned and controlled property of the Barangay. The other accused also willfully and unlawfully used a motor vehicle owned by the same Barangay.

A Motion for Removal from the Office was filed against them before the Regional Trial Court.

Rogelio together with the other accused have filed their comments on the ground that the RTC do not have jurisdiction over the case, but instead, it was the MTC having cognization thereof since the penalty does not exceed six years. They also argued that their case is not subject to R.A.3019.

However, upon trial and investigation, the trial court issued its decision granting the Motion for Removal from their office.

ISSUES:

1.         Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

2.         Whether or not preventive suspension under R.A. 3091 be applied in this case?

 

HELD:

1.     Yes. It is evident from Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691, that the jurisdiction of first-level courts, the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provision of law are cognizable by regional trial courts.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, it provides that the regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Code, "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.

2.     Yes. Section 13 of R.A. 3019, as amended, provides: Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid Information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office…

It must be emphasized that petitioners were incumbent public officers charged with the unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in their custody, in the pursuit of personal interests. The crime being imputed to them is akin to that committed by public officers as laid down in the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, petitioners' acts constitute fraud against the government; thus, the present case is covered by Section 13 of RA 3019.

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner, vs. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents, GR No. 49549 August 30, 1990

 What happened?

Evelyn Chua is a school teacher employed at a private learning institute, (Tay Yung High School). She was the class adviser of sixth grade where Bobby Qua enrolled. During that time, Evelyn is already thirty (30), while Bobby Qua is only sixteen (16) years of age.  In that school, it was its policy of the school to extent remedial instruction to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted to such instruction in school by Evelyn Chua.  In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and subsequently they got married. Of course, after the consent and advise to the marriage was given by Bobby’s mother.

Thereafter, the school represented by its Executive President, without conducting any formal hearing terminated the employment contract of Evelyn Chua on the ground that she is defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory, and that she stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.

The school further alleged that to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and the school. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, Evelyn had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Thus, Evelyn Chua committed immoral and misconduct which warrant her termination.

Issue:    Whether or not Evelyn Chua is legally terminated from her Employment?

Held:     We are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law.

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal.

WAKALA: It’s Concept and Permissibility

Wakala is a structure that utilizes the idea of principal and agent theory. The principal provides the capital, and the agent gets hired to provide expertise and labor. Under a wakala, the capital provider receives the profits from the venture, less an agreed-upon fee that goes to pay the agent. Bank deposits can also be structured as a wakala.[1]

The word “Wakala” literally has several meanings including, delegation, authorization, preservation and performing a task on behalf of others. Technically Wakala refers to a type of contract in which one person delegated another person to perform some tasks on behalf of him.[2] Wakala has essential element as a matter of contract, these are the principal (muwakkil), the agent (wakil) and the subject matter (muwakkal bihi). These three elements must be concurred for its validity.[3]

According to Imaam al Shawkhani, “It is permissible for an owner to give authority to someone else to act his behalf in respect of every dealings in as much as there is nothing that could legally prevent such, If an agent sells beyond the amount specified by the owner, the excess money goes to the owner, and if the he acts contrary to the owner’s specification for a better achievement or he like, and the owner is pleased with it, then the transaction becomes valid.”[4]

One of the legal basis from Qur’an often cited on the principle of wakala is the verse found in Surah al Baqara, when Allah said:

وَإِذ قالَ رَبُّكَ لِلمَلائِكَةِ إِنّي جاعِلٌ فِي الأَرضِ خَليفَةً ۖ قالوا أَتَجعَلُ فيها مَن يُفسِدُ فيها وَيَسفِكُ الدِّماءَ وَنَحنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسُ لَكَ ۖ قالَ إِنّي أَعلَمُ ما لا تَعلَم

When your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed I am going to set a vicegerent on the earth, ’they said, ‘Will You set in it someone who will cause corruption in it, and shed blood, while we celebrate Your praise and proclaim Your sanctity? He said, ‘Indeed I know what you do not know.’[5]

However, it has to be noted that according to Muslims scholars, the mentioned verse was mainly referring to the authority which Allah has bestowed upon man on earth, such as leadership or political leadership, and as spiritual torch bearer in the Muslim community. A khalifa or viceregent as contemplated from this legislation also in the purview of leading a small unit, such as but not limited to a family, firm, organization, platoons of military armies, or any other institution that requires management and leadership.          

In relation to the discussion on wakala as far as Islamic commercial transactions are concerned, Wakala in modern sense could be linked to the Remittances. According to the basic definition, "a remittance means "send back." In terms of money, a remittance is the sending of money to a recipient who lives abroad. Most families living in slow-growing economies and developing nations rely heavily on these remittances as their main source of income, (anonymous, ccto)".  

Accordingly, the three essential elements of Wakala as mentioned above, Muwakkil is the principal or sender, wakil as the agent, while muwakkil bihe is the subject matter, or the money to be sent. Thus, in remittances, muwakkil is the sender of money from abroad, and wakil is the remittance center, or a bank who facilitates the transferee, while the money is the muwakkil bihe, or the object of the transaction. Thereafter, every successful transaction of remittances was accompanied by a written contract. The receipt issued by the wakil or agent serves as evidence of a perfected contract between the wakil or agent and the muwakkil or principal-sender.          

Based on this transaction, the agent or wakil was entrusted by the muwakkil of his property (money transfer), as such it contemplates the notion of Wakala. Hence, under Islamic commercial transaction, the wakala or remittances is permissible, provided that when the agent do not transgress to the limit as to the authority given to him by the principal, (i.e.) that the agent do not misappropriate the fund entrusted to him to be remitted.

Another Qur’anic legislation that regulates Islamic commercial transaction was found in Surah al Baqara, when Allah said:

يا أَيُّهَا الَّذينَ آمَنوا إِذا تَدايَنتُم بِدَينٍ إِلىٰ أَجَلٍ مُسَمًّى فَاكتُبوهُ ۚ وَليَكتُب بَينَكُم كاتِبٌ بِالعَدلِ ۚ وَلا يَأبَ كاتِبٌ أَن يَكتُبَ كَما عَلَّمَهُ اللَّهُ ۚ فَليَكتُب وَليُملِلِ الَّذي عَلَيهِ الحَقُّ وَليَتَّقِ اللَّهَ رَبَّهُ وَلا يَبخَس مِنهُ شَيئًا ۚ فَإِن كانَ الَّذي عَلَيهِ الحَقُّ سَفيهًا أَو ضَعيفًا أَو لا يَستَطيعُ أَن يُمِلَّ هُوَ فَليُملِل وَلِيُّهُ بِالعَدلِ 

O you who have believed, when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it down. And let a scribe write (it) between you in justice. Let no scribe refuse to write as Allah has taught him. So let him write and let the one who has the obligation dictate. And let him fear Allah, his Lord, and not leave anything out of it. But if the one who has the obligation is of limited understanding or weak or unable to dictate himself, then let his guardian dictate in justice.[6]

 

This verse highlighted the general procedure on how a credit should be regulated, and the fundamental requisites. Thus, an oral agreement is something not recommended under this ruling, instead, a written agreement is preferred. One of the reasons could be that a man in character is scatterbrained, and upon writing, such is to become conclusive evidence. 

To be valid, credit transaction must contain the following: (1), that there is specified credit (2), such must be in writing (3), in a just (4), if one of the parties is illiterate, weak of understating, be represented by his guardian with just (5), and that there should be witnessed by at least two men, or two women and one man. It must be noted that the required witness for this kind of transaction is two men of just, or two women together with one man all of them be of just.[7] 

 

Conclusion 

Wakala, this principle falls within the second division of Islamic aspects called Muammalat. It is referring to the relationship between man and his fellow in relation to the formulation of human society and their community; such relationship is governed by Shari’ah as to the civil aspects of the law.

As defined above, Wakala regulates the business transaction between the principal and his duly authorized representative. When the principal authorized other in his behalf, it is viewed that whatever may be the action taken by the delegate, is the same as it was executed by the principal by himself, and by his owned utterances and act, provided, however, that agent do not step up wholly in the shoe of the principal without his consent.

In other words, although Wakala is permitted, it not absolute. The act of the agent to be valid must be confined to the authorized acts purported to be, otherwise, that act could be challenged. Also, the agent under this principle would not only be limited as to the specific action that he may exercise, but it should be in accordance with the essential requisites mentioned in the Qur’anic regulation. 

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[1] https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/islamic-finance

[2] Dr. Kheiralla Sirour, The Rules of Wakala Contract (agency) in Sharia law and its application in Islamic Finance A Comparative study, 2015

[3] Ibid

[4] Ash-Shawkhani, Comprehensive Islamic Jurisprudence, Dakwah Corner Bookstore, Malaysia, 1173-1255H, p., 593

[5] Al Qur’an, 2:30

[6] Al Qur’an, 2:282

[7] Ibid, 2015

ROMY AGAG, petitioner vs. ALPHA FINANCING CORPORATION, respondent, GR. No. 154826, July 31, 2003

Doctrine:     The rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of land is not required to look further than what appears on the face of the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions. These entities are required to exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands for their business is one affected with public interest. The ascertainment of the status and condition of properties offered to it must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.

Facts:                     On March 15, 1977, petitioner Romy Agag and Teresita Vda. De Castro executed a document denominated as "Pinagtibay na Pagpapatibay" whereby the latter sold to petitioner, in consideration of the amount of P36,120.00, payable on installment basis, three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. On the same date, petitioner took possession of and occupied said lots after paying a down payment. He was able to pay a total of P37,295.78. Meanwhile, he introduced improvements on the subject lots consisting of fruit trees and a residential house worth more or less P500,000.00. He repeatedly demanded from De Castro the delivery to him of the title of the lots but the latter failed to do so.

On January 30, 1997, petitioner received a letter from respondent Alpha Financing Corporation requesting him to vacate the disputed lots. Respondent claimed that it is the lawful owner of the subject parcels of land occupied by petitioner, having purchased the same in a foreclosure sale after Teresita Vda. De Castro, the original owner thereof failed to pay her loan with a mortgagee bank. Thereafter, the certificates of title in the name of De Castro were cancelled, and a Certificate of Title were issued in the name of respondent. In view of petitioner’s refusal to vacate the premises, respondent filed an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court.

The Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. It held that the mortgage and the foreclosure sale from which respondent allegedly derived his rights are inferior to the prior unregistered deed of absolute sale executed by De Castro, the original owner in favor of petitioner. Since De Castro was no longer the owner of the property at the time of the mortgage, respondent acquired no right from her. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and ordered petitioner to vacate the lots in favor of respondent. It held that the latter had a better right to possess the lots because the best proof of ownership is the indefeasible and incontrovertible title registered in its name.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent has a better right to possess the disputed lots?

Held:  In the case at bar, the resolution of the issue of ownership is indispensable because respondent’s cause of action and petitioner’s defense are both grounded on ownership of the questioned lots. Respondent invokes good faith and the indefeasibility of the transfer certificates of title issued in its name, while petitioner anchors his claim on prior possession as well as on the unregistered sale in his favor of subject lots as embodied in the "Pinagtibay na Pagpapatibay".

The Municipal Trial Court did not err in sustaining the claim of petitioner that the sale of the questioned lots preceded the mortgage and foreclosure sale claimed by respondent. Petitioner had repeatedly challenged respondent to produce documentary evidence which would substantiate the mortgage and foreclosure sale, but the latter failed to produce any. Neither did respondent question the finding of the Municipal Trial Court that the sale occurred prior to the mortgage, nor did it give the name of the mortgagee bank which foreclosed and sold the lots at public auction, assuming that the said bank exists. Finally, respondent failed to show that the properties were indeed mortgaged, and that the mortgage was foreclosed and the lots sold at public action.                   

As a general rule, where there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title indicates on its face, in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. This rule, however, applies only to innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value or any equivalent phrase shall be deemed, under Section 39 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act), to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee or any other encumbrancer for value. It excludes a purchaser or mortgagee who has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the property.

Respondent, being a financial institution, cannot claim good faith considering that neither it nor the alleged mortgagee bank was in possession of the lots prior and after the foreclosure sale. Had respondent conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, this being the standard practice in the real estate industry, it would have discovered that the land is occupied by petitioner. The failure of respondent to take such precautionary steps is considered negligence on its part and would thereby preclude the defense of good faith.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.